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Municipality Size and Efficiency  
of Local Public Services: Does Size Matter? 
Abstract 
Similarly to West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, the eastern part of Germany has ex 
perienced a still ongoing process of numerous amalgamations among counties, towns 
and  municipalities  since  the  mid 1990s.  The  evidence  in  the  economic  literature  is 
mixed with regard to the claimed expenditure reductions and efficiency gains from mu 
nicipal  mergers.  We  therefore  analyze  the  global  efficiency  of  the  municipalities  in 
Saxony Anhalt, for the first time in this context, using a double bootstrap procedure 
combining Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and truncated regression. This allows in 
cluding environmental variables to control for exogenous determinants of municipal ef 
ficiency. Our focus thereby is on institutional and fiscal variables. Moreover, the scale 
efficiency is estimated to find out whether large units are necessary to benefit from scale 
economies. In contrast to previous studies, we chose the aggregate budget of municipal 
associations  (“Verwaltungsgemeinschaften”)  as  the  object  of  our  analysis  since  im 
portant competences of the member municipalities are settled on a joint administrative 
level. Furthermore, we use a data set that has been carefully adjusted for bookkeeping 
items and transfers within the communal level. On the “eve” of a mayor municipal re 
form, the majority of the municipalities was  found to have  an approximately scale 
efficient size, and centralized organizational forms (“Einheitsgemeinden”) showed no 
efficiency advantage over municipal associations.  
 
Keywords:  efficiency, local government, DEA, bootstrap, demographic change, local 
institutions 
JEL Classification: H11, H72 
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Gemeindegröße und Effizienz der kommunalen  
Leistungen: Ist die Größe wirklich entscheidend? 
Zusammenfassung 
Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre findet auch in Ostdeutschland – ähnlich wie in den 1960er 
und 1970er Jahren in Westdeutschland – ein noch keineswegs abgeschlossener Prozess 
mit zahlreichen Verschmelzungen auf der Ebene der Landkreise, Städte und Gemeinden 
statt. Die Ergebnisse in der ökonomischen Literatur sind uneinheitlich, was die behaup 
teten Ausgabeneinsparungen und die Effizienzgewinne durch Gemeindegebietsreformen 
betrifft. Aus diesem Grunde untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag die globale Effizienz der 
Gemeinden in Sachsen Anhalt unter Anwendung eines doppelten Bootstrap Verfahrens, 
das Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) und trunkierte Regression kombiniert und in 
diesem Zusammenhang bislang noch nicht verwendet wurde. Dadurch wird es möglich, 
Umweltvariablen  einzubeziehen,  um  so  für  exogene  Bestimmungsfaktoren  der  ge 
meindlichen Effizienz zu kontrollieren. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf institutionellen und 
fiskalischen Variablen. Außerdem berechnen wir die Skaleneffizienz, um zu prüfen, ob 
große Gemeinden nötig sind, um von Skaleneffekten profitieren zu können. Im Gegen 
satz zu den Arbeiten anderer Autoren wurde bei kommunalen Verbänden („Verwal 
tungsgemeinschaften“) das aggregierte Budget als Untersuchungsgegenstand gewählt, 
da  wichtige  Entscheidungsbefugnisse  der  Mitgliedsgemeinden  auf  der  gemeinsamen 
Verwaltungsebene angesiedelt sind. Außerdem wurde der verwendete Datensatz sorg 
fältig um reine Buchhaltungspositionen und Transferzahlungen innerhalb der Gemein 
deebene bereinigt. Am „Vorabend“ einer umfassenden Gemeindereform erwies sich die 
Größe der Gemeinden mehrheitlich als annähernd skaleneffizient und stärker zentra 
lisierte Verwaltungsformen („Einheitsgemeinden“) wiesen keinen Effizienzvorteil ge 
genüber Gemeindeverbänden auf. 
 
Schlagwörter: Effizienz,  Kommunen,  DEA,  Bootstrap Verfahren,  demographischer 
Wandel, Verwaltungsform 
JEL Klassifikation: H11, H72  
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1   Introduction 
In the eastern part of Germany there has been a continuous trend of massive amalgama 
tions among counties, towns and municipalities since the mid nineties of the last century. 
The municipal territorial reforms in the former GDR follow the same spirit as the re 
forms during the late sixties and early seventies in western Germany. These municipal 
mergers in Germany have their counterparts mainly in the municipal reforms in North 
ern and Western Europe.  
Since 2000 especially in Nordic countries – Denmark and Finland, but currently with 
the exception of Sweden and Norway – the municipal structure has undergone substan 
tial structural reforms or at least a gradual process of merging municipal units. The 
Swedish municipal reforms of 1952 and 1974 reduced the number of municipalities 
from 2500 to about 1000 in 1952 and finally to 278 in 1974 (currently there are 290 
municipalities in Sweden; Bäck 2005). Norway has also continuously reduced the num 
ber of municipalities from about 750 in 1930 to currently 430 (Wikipedia contributors 
2011).  Municipal  amalgamations  have  also  taken  place  e.g.  in  Israel  (Reingewertz 
2010),  Australia  (Dollery  et  al.  2008),  in  several  Canadian  provinces  (Kushner  and 
Siegel 2000), and in Japan (Yokomichi n.d.). The radical local government reform in 
the UK about 25 years ago left the country with the largest average local government 
size in Europe (in terms of population). Fox and Gurley (2006) also mention “govern 
ment consolidation” reforms in Jordan, Sudan, Zimbawve or Lativa, whereas Italy has 
increased its number of local governments.  
According to Fox and Gurley (2006), the declared main goals of municipal concentra 
tions are falling service delivery costs, more even or equitable provision of services and 
better planning across a metropolitan area. For the Nordic countries Steineke (2010) 
concludes: “In all Nordic countries, a central argument in promoting municipal mergers 
is that public welfare services are more efficiently produced in larger municipalities.“  
These arguments usually neglect the effects of political institutions or the increasing 
heterogeneity in preferences for public goods with increasing municipality size on local 
government spending – cornerstones of the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal 
federalism. Thus, in this paper we test empirically whether decentralized municipalities 
(municipal associations) are less technically efficient in public goods provision than 
centralized ones (individual municipalities) and whether municipal associations enable 
the member municipalities to realize economies of scale without losing their status as 
independent entities – even if coordination costs were higher in such associations. 
To this end and in contrast to recent studies for Germany (Geys et al. 2010, Kalb 2010a, 
Kriese 2008), we use the nonparametric DEA procedure to overcome the problem of 
missing input prices in flexible functional forms in SFA analyses. We account for the 
serial correlation of the efficiency scores by applying the two stage bootstrapped DEA  
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procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) to calculate non parametric measures 
of global (technical) municipal efficiency and to control for the influence of certain en 
vironmental variables. The latter include especially indicators for municipal cooperation 
such as the organizational form or the number of member municipalities which were 
neglected in previous studies. Furthermore, we estimate the scale efficiency. Also devi 
ating from recent studies for Germany (Geys et al. 2010, Kalb 2010a, Kriese 2008), we 
calculate an aggregate budget for municipal associations since certain tasks are delegat 
ed from the member municipalities to the joint administration so that outputs of the 
member municipalities cannot be compared to those of individual municipalities. We 
use a very detailed and unique data set for the German state Saxony Anhalt. Moreover, 
we invested considerable effort to purge the municipal financial data from non cost ex 
penditures or double counting caused by inter municipal cash flows or cash flows be 
tween municipalities and other levels of local government to increase the accuracy of 
our estimates.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we discuss the existing empirical litera 
ture on municipal mergers and in particular the more recent research on global efficien 
cy of local governments. Section 3 develops the theoretical background for our efficien 
cy estimations. In section 4 we describe the institutional framework, the data and the 
methodology for the efficiency estimation. Section 5 presents the results and in section 
6 we conclude and discuss further research perspectives. 
2   Overview of the Empirical Literature on Global Municipal 
Efficiency Analysis 
In contrast to the widespread “bigger is better” attitude of the promoters of municipal 
mergers the economic empirical literature is not conclusive about the expenditure or  
efficiency effects of municipal mergers.  
First of all, there are a lot of empirical papers dealing with the relationship between sev 
eral fiscal indicators and municipal size in general or with the pre amalgamation or 
post amalgamation effects on these fiscal indicators (expenditures, debts, revenues) in 
particular.  The  estimation  results  for  expenditure functions  – predominantly  derived 
from a median voter based model – usually indicate economies of scale or potentials for 
cost reduction only for small municipalities (e.g. Solé Ollé and Bosch 2005, Welling 
Hansen 2009). One exception is Reingewertz (2010) who found a 9% decrease in ex 
penditures for Israeli municipalities compared to the pre amalgamation situation and 
therefore concluded that municipal mergers would result in significant scale economies. 
Hence, the main research focus of these papers is how municipal size might influence 
the municipal per capita expenditures or costs. As the underlying production technology 
is assumed to be efficient, the error term contains inefficiency components and statistic 
noise, which are not separable. Finally, the core problem of this econometric expendi  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH Discussion Papers 18/2011  7 
ture  or cost function approach is that despite of controlling for environmental variables 
the estimation results represent a mix of economies of scale in consumption (“econo 
mies of sharing”) and economies of scale and scope in production.  
Therefore, parametric  or non parametric methods of efficiency analysis are more prom 
ising options. These approaches allow for ignoring the question how a certain quantity 
of municipal output resulted from the political process and if it represents a welfare 
maximizing optimum from the perspective of a benevolent social planer. They simply 
analyze whether either a given output quantity is produced with minimum input (input 
oriented  approach) or the maximum output is produced with a  given input quantity 
(output orientation).  
The existing literature on municipal efficiency analysis can be divided into two branch 
es: On the one hand, there are numerous analyses of individual public services: solid 
waste and sewage disposal (Worthington and Dollery 2001), water (Picazo et al. 2009, 
Byrnes et al. 2010, Zschille et al. 2010) and energy provision (von Hirschhausen et al. 
2006), hospitals (e.g. Aksezer and Benneyan 2010, Blank and Valdmanis 2010), munic 
ipal savings banks (Conrad et al. 2009, Bresler 2007), public libraries (De Witte and 
Geys 2009), road maintenance (Kalb 2009), fire protection (Lan 2009 et al.), care for 
the elderly sector (Borge and Haraldsvik 2009), local police services (García Sánchez 
2009),  public  transportation  (Walter  and  Cullmann  2008)  or  pre school  education 
(Montén and Thater 2010, Montén 2009
1). For a survey of earlier studies see De Borger 
and Kerstens (2000) or Worthington and Dollery (2000). Also Kalb (2010b) contains an 
extensive list of efficiency studies of different public services. With respect to scale 
economies the aforementioned studies are very heterogeneous in their results. Even the 
vertically integrated network services such as water, sewage disposal or energy provi 
sion seem to have only very restricted potentials for size effects. Especially in the case 
of consolidation of urban and rural sewage or water districts the rise in output might be 
far more than outweighed by the additional costs of the distribution system. For Germany, 
a separate analysis of many municipal services (except for those organized in separate 
and independent organizational units such as municipal saving banks, public utilities or 
public transportation) could lead to biased results. The main problem is the impossibil 
ity to assign certain inputs to certain municipal tasks, especially inputs of central admin 
istration units, which represent overhead costs.  
Thus, the approach of global municipal efficiency would be more appropriate for the fo 
cus of our study. The more recent empirical work covers Belgium (Geys and Moesen 
2009, De Borger and Kerstens 1996), Finland (Loikkanen and Susiluoto 2005), Brazil 
(Sampaio de Sousa et al. 2005), Spain (Balaguer Coll and Prior 2009, Gimenez and Prior 
2007, Prieto and Zofio 2001), Portugal (Afonso and Fernandes 2008), Japan (Nijkamp 
and Suzuki 2009) and Germany (Kalb et al. 2011, Geys et al. 2010, Kalb 2010a, Kriese 
2008, Geys et al. 2007). See again De Borger and Kerstens (2000) or Worthington and 
                                                 
1   Montén (2009) also analyzes general administration and city planning separately.  
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Dollery (2000) for surveys of earlier studies. The main results of these papers on the  
relationship between size and performance are rather mixed – if they deal with the ques 
tion at all. Sampaio de Sousa et. al. (2005) found that for Brazil technical efficiency ris 
es with population size. This result is probably a consequence of national characteris 
tics, problematic input indicators (child mortality rate as input!) and not controlling for 
exogenous factors that influence efficiency. Increasing cost efficiency with increasing 
population was also a result of Gimenez and Prior (2007). In contrast, Loikkanen and 
Susiluoto (2005) found smaller municipalities to be more efficient. 
The authors of the aforementioned studies on global municipal efficiency mostly apply 
a non parametric approach (DEA, FDH). When exogenous variables are included then a 
simple, but rather problematic two stage approach is preferred: 1) Calculation of the 
DEA or FDH efficiency scores, 2) Tobit regression of the resulting efficiency scores on 
potential exogenous variables (e.g. Balaguer Coll and Prior 2009, Gimenez and Prior 
2007, Loikkanen and Susiluoto 2005, Afonso and Fernandes 2008, Sung 2007). An ex 
ception is Balaguer Coll et al. (2007) who use non parametric methods in the second 
stage analysis. The German studies and Geys and Moesen (2009) use a one step Sto 
chastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate global cost efficiency. A few studies com 
pare SFA and DEA results (De Borger and Kerstens 1996, Worthington 2000); in these 
cases efficiency scores from both DEA and SFA are explained by environmental varia 
bles in a second stage by a Tobit model. 
Our focus in this paper is on Germany for several reasons: The German municipal sys 
tem offers a broad variety of municipal governance forms. Furthermore, the local gov 
ernments traditionally play an important role in the German federal system. Finally, the 
current demographic pressure (population decline especially in eastern Germany) has 
again stirred up the debate on mergers, amalgamation or centralization of municipali 
ties.  
The cost efficiency analyses for Germany (precisely: the states of Baden Wurttemberg 
and Saxony) mainly ignore the question of municipal size and efficiency and suffer 
from several methodological problems.  
First, they apply highly aggregated cost data which either is not corrected for double 
bookings or for expenditures that are not costs in the usual sense2 or the data contains 
expenditures which do not correspond to the output indicators3. The fact that the authors 
consistently neglect municipal enterprises or single purpose municipal associations in 
their calculations is under some circumstances – as we will discuss in section 4 – only a 
minor problem if certain expenditure categories were deducted from the current expend 
itures.  
                                                 
2   Like the redistributed business tax revenues (“Gewerbesteuerumlage”) which represent the share of 
the federal government in the local business tax revenues.  
3   This is possible for cost refunding between municipalities or transfer payments to municipal units 
not included in the core budget.   
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Second, the unit of observation is always the individual municipality, although in Ba 
den Wurttemberg as well as in Saxony and most other German states small communi 
ties  in  rural  areas  are  allowed  to  form  municipal  associations  (“Verwaltungs 
gemeinschaft”, “Verwaltungsverband”,”Samtgemeinde”, “Amtsgemeinde” etc.) to bene 
fit from economies of scale without losing their status as independent municipalities. 
While this focus on the individual municipality might be acceptable for dealing e.g. 
with voting patterns the results would be severely biased if we wanted to draw conclu 
sions for efficient municipality sizes or global municipal efficiency at all because it is 
common that the members of such associations delegate (or are obliged to delegate) part 
of their tasks either to a central administration unit (“Verwaltungsamt”) or to the usual 
ly largest municipality of the association (“Trägergemeinde”) to carry out certain tasks 
on their behalf. Therefore, we aggregate the budgets of the members of municipal asso 
ciations4 to one budget.  
Finally, the German studies have as a standard assumption no price variables included 
in their “pseudo cost functions”. Even in case we assume identical factor prices (which 
is quite reasonable for jurisdictions located in the same state), price data will only be ir 
relevant for the estimation of certain functional forms (e.g. Cobb Douglas type). How 
ever, for the usually more appropriate flexible functional forms (e.g. translog function) 
the omission of price variables might lead to serious omitted variable problems and mis 
interpretations of the regression coefficients. 
All in all, the question of the existence of scale effects or the effects of decentralized or 
ganizational forms on municipal efficiency – and their consequences for local govern 
ment size – is far from settled or solved.  
3   Municipal Size, Centralization and Efficiency of Local  
Public Good Production 
Evaluating efficiency differences between municipalities of different size, but equal or 
ganizational form or between municipalities of similar size, but different organizational 
form  (centralized  versus  decentralized  organization)  leads  to  the  general  discussion 
about centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods. According to Oates’ 
(1972) “Decentralization Theorem” decentralization makes sense in case of heterogene 
ous preferences among jurisdictions, the absence of cost savings from centralized provi 
sion and the absence of interjurisdictional spillovers.  
                                                 
4   The  German  “Verwaltungsverband”,  “Verwaltungsgemeinschaft”,  “Samtgemeinde”,  “Verbands 
gemeinde” or “Amt” are multi purpose organizations providing most of the core municipal services 
and should not be mixed up with single purpose municipal associations which provide only one or 
two public services, for example water, sewage or solid waste disposal services.   
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If information costs and information asymmetries are taken into account, then infor 
mation costs will be higher for higher levels of government compared to local govern 
ments as well as for smaller local government units compared to larger local govern 
ments. Information asymmetries and prohibitively high information costs may lead to 
over  or underprovision of certain public goods in large communities – even if benevo 
lent politicians and bureaucrats are assumed. This is a further argument for decentral 
ized provision.  
The  empirical  efficiency  analysis  of  local  governments  cannot  answer  the  question 
whether the quantity of services provided is Pareto efficient according e.g. to the Samu 
elson Kaizuka rule for pure public consumption goods or pure public inputs – assuming 
cost  and technical efficiency of public goods production. Instead, we investigate if a 
given quantity of a public output is actually produced technically and allocatively5 effi 
cient. In this context the existence of significant economies of scale in local public good 
production is also tested. Unit cost reductions could result from economies of scale in 
the production technology. Moreover, lower costs per inhabitant – even for production 
technologies with constant returns to scale – could be the result of non rivalry in con 
sumption of the relevant good (“economies of sharing”). See Reiter and Weichenrieder 
(1997) for further details. Both effects usually decrease with increasing municipal size 
(economies of sharing wear out due to fixed resources – especially land – which have to 
be consumed to benefit even from pure public goods) and lead to the well known u 
shaped cost curve (per inhabitant) in the literature.  
Nevertheless, the existence of economies of scale and economies of sharing does not 
justify per se amalgamations of small municipalities to larger units. Gordon Tullock 
(1969) has pointed out that small municipalities could benefit from economies of scale 
by contracting out at least some of their services – either to private suppliers, municipal 
enterprises or other (local) governments. As we have mentioned before, another way of 
“contracting out” is the association of small, but independent municipalities. These as 
sociations  could  either  be  multi purpose  associations  like  the  German 
“Verwaltungsgemeinschaft” or single purpose units6 for the provision of e.g. water, 
sewage disposal etc. The efficiency gains from contracting out are limited by the trans 
action costs involved. Especially hardly tangible and measurable services might lead to 
moral hazard, adverse selection or low service quality. Another problem is services with 
high capital intensity and sunk costs. In this case long term contracts between munici 
                                                 
5   It should be stressed that in the efficiency and productivity analysis literature the term “allocative ef 
ficiency” is used differently from its usual meaning in public finance theory or welfare economics. 
From an input oriented perspective, allocative (in )efficiency measures how much the input quanti 
ties could be reduced proportionally (technically efficient production assumed!) to minimize input 
costs for a fixed output quantity. In this case, allocatively efficient input output combinations are 
also cost efficient. For output orientation the term allocative efficiency is used in a similar manner in 
the context of revenue efficiency. See Coelli et al. (2005, 51 57) for an introduction to the different 
efficiency concepts. 
6   Examples are the German „Zweckverband“ or the US American school districts.  
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pality and provider are common practice and both sides have incentives for strategic  
behavior. Finally, the coordination costs between the member municipalities increase 
disproportionally with an increasing number of municipalities. Therefore, municipal as 
sociations including a large number of members might not be the best idea from an effi 
ciency perspective. 
We have already mentioned the problem of information asymmetries and their effect on 
efficient production of public services. Information asymmetries in principal agent rela 
tions between voters and municipal council as well as between municipal council and 
bureaucrats or external providers might increase the agents´ leeway to follow their own 
interests. For given output quantities, politicians or bureaucrats have incentives for in 
efficient input employment. Vote maximizing politicians might prefer inefficient capital 
use for prestigious investments (“state of the art technology”) or overmanning for so 
cial reasons. Furthermore, the local bureaucrats might also follow their own interests 
such  as  “budget  maximization”  (Niskanen  1971)  or  “slack maximization”7  (e.g. 
Wyckhoff 1990).  
However, there exist two sanctioning mechanisms that could prevent local politicians 
and  bureaucrats  from  abusing  their  information  advantages  in  an  environment  of 
interjurisdictional competition: “Exit” and “Voice” of the citizens (Hirshman 1970). It 
seems reasonable to assume that interjurisdictional competition is more effective be 
tween large numbers of small municipalities than between ceteris paribus few large mu 
nicipal units: The citizens’ information costs and migration costs tend to be lower for 
small  municipalities  with  decentralized  organization.  Most  theoretical  studies  of  the 
“second generation theory” (Oates 2005, Weingast 2009) of fiscal federalism that in 
clude election processes and exit options conclude that a decentralized provision of lo 
cal public goods might be allocatively superior to the centralized provision. In the mod 
el of Besley and Coate (2003) the central government discriminates against certain re 
gions as a result of so called “pork barrel politics” and the budget externalities caused 
by the simultaneous access of the political agents to a “common pool”. Similar sub 
optimal decisions in the provision of local public goods (or inefficiencies in production) 
are possible in more centralized municipalities compared to municipal associations of 
equal size. Seabright (1996) models elections as “incomplete contracts”. In his model 
the centralization – decentralization decision is a tradeoff between gains in coordination 
(internalization of spillovers) and losses in accountability (here: probability that the wel 
fare of the individual jurisdiction might influence government election). This tradeoff is 
similar to the spillover – preference heterogeneity tradeoff of Oates (1972) except for 
the fact that decentralization might be preferable even in case of homogenous prefer 
ences – if the gains in accountability exceeded the losses in coordination. Oates (2005, 
359) assumes (without proof) that the introduction of Pigouvian matching grants to in 
ternalize the spillovers might even make this tradeoff disappear.  
                                                 
7   “Slack” refers to the surplus of the budget the sponsor (the local government) is willing to finance 
over the actual minimum costs.  
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Our theoretical considerations on the efficiency effects of size and the degree of central 
ization of local government organization can be summed up in the following two hy 
potheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Municipal associations are ceteris paribus at least equally technically  
efficient and scale efficient as centralized local governments. 
Hypothesis 2: Efficiency decreases with rising numbers of member municipalities in 
municipal associations. 
Other aspects that might influence municipal efficiency could be subsumed under the 
term “fiscal illusion”. From the five categories of fiscal illusion listed by Oates (1988) 
we are mainly interested in debt illusion and the effects of intergovernmental grants.  
We  have  already  mentioned  the problems  of  spillover  effects  of  local public  goods 
which suggest that the “boundaries” of a public good should be equal to the boundaries 
of the jurisdiction providing it. According to Mancur Olson’s (1969) “principle of fiscal 
equivalence”, this includes that the jurisdictions should also have the right to decide if a 
certain public good is provided at all and if so, what output quantities should be pro 
duced and what inputs and production technologies should be employed. In practice  
– not only in Germany – municipal services are regulated to a considerable extent by 
higher authorities. For example, German parents are legally entitled to preschool educa 
tion for their children. Consequently, the municipalities have to provide adequate kin 
dergarten capacities whether there is demand for them or not and irrespective of the 
costs involved (output regulation). Furthermore, there are often detailed prescriptions 
concerning training and qualifications of kindergarten teachers as well as the teacher 
children ratio (input regulation).  
Fiscal equivalence also means that the jurisdiction providing the public good should not 
only have the right to decide how much of the good as well as how to produce it, but it 
(or  its  citizens)  should  also  have  to  finance  it.  If  this  principle  is  violated  (see  the  
kindergarten example), then according to the general rule “who orders has to pay” the 
“ordering” jurisdictions will have to cover at least some of the costs of the regulated ju 
risdictions.  However,  intergovernmental  grants  might  have  a  negative  side effect  on  
efficiency which is known in the literature as the “flypaper effect” (Hines and Thaler 
1995): If the output quantities were more or less fixed municipalities might have incen 
tives to use inefficiently large input quantities (e.g. “representative” public buildings). 
This effect is supposed to stem from individuals (politicians) treating money on hand 
(grants) different than money that has to be raised by taxation of the own citizens. Al 
ternatively,  inefficiencies  caused  by  transfer  payments  may  be  the  result  of  “soft” 
budget constraints (Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003) for local governments. Munici 
palities ﬁnanced primarily with transfers from higher jurisdictions (as in eastern Ger 
many) might find opportunities for “raiding the ﬁscal commons” and increase the size 
of their budget (Rodden 2003) as well as municipal inefficiency.   
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Hypothesis 3: Local government efficiency decreases with increasing grant (lump sum 
or matching grants) availability.  
Except for a world consistent with the Ricardo Barro equivalence theorem of public 
debt, citizens tend to underestimate the future burdens of public debt. Therefore, espe 
cially vote maximizing local politicians have incentives to shift the financial burden of 
the municipal expenses to future generations. As there usually are severe restrictions on 
debt financing of current expenditures in many countries for local governments, mainly 
debt financed investments might cause excess public capital stocks and expenditures. 
Especially municipalities on the eve of a merger (Jordahl and Liang 2010) might accu 
mulate excessive debts under the illusion of a larger “common pool” of revenues in the 
future. 
Hypothesis 4: Local government efficiency decreases with increasing debt burden.  
To take heterogeneity among the municipalities into account, we include further control 
variables which have been shown to be relevant in the literature: population density, 
population change, unemployment, and age structure.  
This selection certainly does not include all possible structural variables which might 
determine local government efficiency. One could think of other variables such as the 
share of foreigners, the share of people of a certain religious denomination or the pres 
ence of private non profit organizations8 which offer substitutes for local public goods 
and services. We do not include political variables (significance of left wing parties or 
political fragmentation) for several reasons: First, it does not make much sense to calcu 
late an aggregated Herfindahl index or the aggregated share of left wing seats for a  
municipal  association  with  many  independent  municipalities.  Furthermore,  in  small 
municipalities the number of councilors without party affiliation or councilors that are 
members of independent voters unions is high – and the mayors are not even obliged to 
reveal their party affiliation in Saxony Anhalt. Thus, it is difficult or even impossible to 
calculate and interpret the most popular political indicators for our chosen object of 
analysis. 
   
                                                 
8   It should be noted that the presence of e.g. kindergartens run by churches or other private non profit 
organizations does not necessarily reduce municipal spending on those services. In fact, German 
municipalities are obliged to provide and finance certain services with a given quality and quantity. 
They have to compensate the non municipal providers for their expenditures.  
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4   Institutional Framework, Data and Methodology 
4.1   Institutional Framework in Saxony Anhalt and Descriptive Sta 
tistics 
In 2004 the local government level in Saxony Anhalt was divided into 21 rural districts 
(“Landkreise”) and 3 district free towns (“kreisfreie Städte”: Halle, Magdeburg and 
Dessau). The rural districts consisted of 1115 district affiliated towns and municipalities 
(“kreisangehörige Städte und Gemeinden”). Due to the great difference between district 
tasks and municipal tasks we restrict our efficiency analysis to the district affiliated mu 
nicipalities and towns. The district free towns are also not included because they carry 
out both municipal and district tasks – without budget separation.  
Saxony Anhalt is well suited for the efficiency analysis of district affiliated municipalities. 
First,  the  range  of  municipal  tasks  is  rather  homogeneous  –  there  are  no  district 
affiliated towns with a special legal status (“Große Kreisstadt”) carrying out district du 
ties as for example in Saxony or in Baden Württemberg. Second, we are able to investi 
gate the effect (if there is any) of three different municipal governance forms on global 
efficiency. On the one hand, there are independent municipalities carrying out the whole 
spectrum of municipal tasks on their own (“Einheitsgemeinde”).  
On the other hand, especially the smaller communities are obliged by municipal law to 
join an association of several other municipalities, but without losing their legal status 
as an independent municipality. In 2004 two different forms of these municipal associa 
tions existed in Saxony Anhalt: In the first case the members are obliged by municipal 
law to transfer the planning, organization, provision and control of the main municipal 
services to a central administration unit with a separate budget. This joint administration 
office (“gemeinsames Verwaltungsamt”) acts on behalf of the member municipalities. 
In  the  second  case  one  (usually  the  largest)  of  the  member  municipalities 
(“Trägergemeinde”) provides own administration facilities to carry out the tasks trans 
ferred to the municipal association on behalf of its members, but without separate budg 
eting. In the following we will refer to the first case as “Type A associations” and to the 
second case as “Type B associations”. In both cases the members pay contributions or 
compensations to refund the expenditures for tasks transferred to the joint administra 
tion. In contrast to the expenditure side the tax revenues as well as the transfers received 
from the municipal fiscal equalization system remain at the member level. Figure1 gives 
an overview of the local government administrative structure of Saxony Anhalt.  
Now in order to choose the relevant input and output variables we examine the munici 
pal expenditure structure in Saxony Anhalt. The following table 1 illustrates the compo 
sition of the current expenditures.  
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Figure 1:  
Local government structure in Saxony Anhalt 2004 
 
Source: authors´ illustration 
The table shows clearly that the expenditure categories financial management, social  
security  and administration covered about 70% of the current expenditures in 2004. 
However, deviating from previous studies on German municipal efficiency the category 
financial management will be excluded from our further calculations – except for the 
category interest payments. Otherwise some problematic items of this category may 
cause distortions and misinterpretations because they are either compensations for ex 
penditures of other members of municipal associations (e.g. transfer payments to the 
joint administration office: “Verwaltungsgemeinschaftsumlage”) or transfer payments 
of the member municipalities to their district (“Kreisumlage”) that do not correspond to 
any output at the municipal level or they even do not represent factor costs at all like the 
redistributed business tax revenues (“Gewerbesteuerumlage”). Table 1 also illustrates 
the necessity to analyze the global municipal efficiency because the interest payments in 
category 9 as well as the expenditures of category 0 and some items of 7 and 6 represent 
overhead costs which otherwise had to be allocated pro rata to the particular municipal 
service – a rather arbitrary procedure.  
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Table 1: 
Structure of current expenditures in the municipal core budgets in Saxony Anhalt 2004 
in percent (mean) 
  District affiliated municipalities   
Variable  Category 
number  All  Type A  
associations 





Administration  0  15.62  13.74  24.57  13.79 
Public safety  1  3.40  3.17  3.58  3.89 
Schools  2  3.51  3.65  2.89  3.62 
Science, research, culture  3  1.28  0.71  1.88  2.37 
Social security  4  17.82  16.75  18.23  20.34 
Healthcare, sports, recreation  5  2.95  2.50  3.39  3.81 
Buildings, housing, traffic  6  6.11  5.73  5.71  7.45 
Public facilities and economic development  7  7.50  6.99  7.04  9.21 
Municipal  enterprises,  public  utilities,  public 
real estate and special assets  8  2.62  3.07  2.07  1.80 
Financial management  9  39.24  43.70  30.64  33.94 
Source: authors´ calculations 
Another difficulty for the global municipal efficiency analysis is the existence of “shad 
ow budgets”. Several municipal services are usually provided by municipal enterprises 
or municipal special purpose associations and are not included in the municipality’s 
core budget. Consequently, this might lead to underestimation of municipal expendi 
tures. However, this rather seems to be a problem for the independent cities and districts 
than for the district affiliated municipalities. Table A in the appendix lists all municipal 
tasks with a median greater than zero per cent, i.e. at least 50% of the district affiliated 
municipalities and the municipal associations have positive expenditures in that catego 
ry. The categories listed here cover on average about 88% of the current expenditures 
(financial management excluded). Table 1 and table A also reveal that expenditures for 
childcare services and overhead costs represent over 50% of the total current expendi 
tures. We found 298 municipal enterprises and special purpose associations owned by 
the district affiliated municipalities. About two thirds are mainly public utilities (sewage 
disposal,  water,  district  heating,  gas,  electricity  and  public  transport)  and  municipal 
housing companies. As there are no output indicators for public utilities and housing 
companies available we have to exclude these enterprises and their related current ex 
penditures in the core budget (category number 8, except 88: administration of real es 
tate) from our calculations. Especially if we deduct the expenditures for sewage dispos 
al, which consist primarily of transfer payments or compensations to special purpose as 
sociations, from the current expenditures, this leaves only 23 municipal enterprises that 
might cause minor distortions if we neglect the municipal enterprise sector in our analy 
sis.   
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Deducting certain categories of municipal services that either do not correspond to out 
puts at the municipal level or for which output indicators (e.g. rented flats of municipal 
housing companies) are not available is one way of adjusting the expenditure figures. 
But we also have to take expenditure or revenue flows between the municipality and ei 
ther other local governments or private enterprises into account. A first (and also the 
main) step in this direction was the exclusion of the transfer payments in category 9. To 
correct for double cost counting caused by compensations and grants between munici 
palities which do not have to be members of the same municipal association, we deduct 
for every municipality the revenues from grants or cost refunding received from other 
municipalities from the input expenditures (including expenditures for grants or cost re 
funding to other municipalities.)  
However, grants or cost refunds of the remaining categories to private or public enter 
prises or to private non profit organizations (kindergartens!) are included in our input 
figures. The underlying assumption is that the receiving units provide local public ser 
vices (or at least intermediate inputs for the municipality’s administration) which the 
municipality would have had to provide itself otherwise. 
4.2   Methodology 
Two approaches to analyzing efficiency, the ability to transform inputs into outputs, 
have emerged: on the one hand, parametric approaches, in particular stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al. 1977 and Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977), are em 
ployed and on the other hand, non parametric methods like Free Disposable Hull (FDH) 
(Deprins et al. 1984) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (introduced by Charnes et 
al. 1978) based on the seminal work by Farrell (1957) are used. Although the SFA has 
the advantage of allowing deviations from the frontier due to measurement error or sto 
chastic influences, it is usually not appropriate for measuring cost efficiency when price 
data are not available:  In case of the mostly used flexible functional forms like the 
translog the omission of prices leads to omitted variable problems. As input prices are 
not available, the DEA is chosen here. Moreover, it is then not necessary to specify a 
functional form which is not obvious for public decision making units.  
In the DEA model a convex hull is constructed from the data by applying linear pro 
gramming techniques resulting in a piecewise linear frontier which represents the pro 
duction  possibilities.  We  choose  an  input  orientation  because  municipalities  are  ex 
pected to have more discretion in choosing their input mix while certain outputs have to 
be provided.9 Thus, the frontier is based on the observations that need the least inputs to 
generate their outputs. With a higher number of inputs and outputs the decision making 
units are compared along more dimensions which results in a larger number of efficient 
                                                 
9   Only under constant returns to scale the efficiency scores from input and output orientation are recip 
rocals (Cooper et al. 2007).  
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units. The number of inputs and outputs should therefore not be too high. All decision 
making units are subsequently radially compared to the frontier.  
In our main analysis we assume variable returns to scale (BCC model, Banker et al. 
1984). For the scale efficiency, we also calculate cost efficiency scores under constant 
returns to scale (CCR model, Charnes et al. 1978). Cost efficiency analysis requires in 
formation about input prices. These are not known, but are assumed to be the same for 
all  municipalities.  Since  all  municipalities  within  one  state  face  the  same  collective 
wage agreement and have access to the same capital market, this is a plausible assump 
tion. Cost  and technical efficiency are the same under these circumstances (Färe and 
Primont 1988) and the usual BCC /CCR models can be applied with input quantities 
replaced by expenditures for the inputs. We compute i=1,…,   linear programs, one for 
each municipality observed. The linear program to be solved for the i th municipality 



















where θ is a scalar and the Farrell measure of technical efficiency, C is the q×   input 
matrix containing costs for the q inputs of all municipalities and Y the p×  output quan 
tity matrix. λ is a column vector of constants and I a (1× ) vector of ones. For our pur 
poses  we  use  the  input  distance  function,  which  is  the  reciprocal  of  the  efficiency 
scoreθ. Thus, efficient units, lying on the frontier, receive an efficiency score of one; in 
efficient units have an efficiency score greater than one. 
In order to analyze factors that constrain the input and output choices of municipalities 
and thus influence the efficiency, but that are not part of the production process, the cal 
culated efficiency scores are regressed on environmental variables in a second step. Of 
ten a censored regression is used since the input distance function cannot take on values 
below one (e.g. De Borger and Kerstens 1996, Worthington 2000, Gimenez and Prior 
2007, Afonso and Fernandes 2008). In this case the process that determines the proba 
bility of censoring and the process determining the uncensored observations are restrict 
ed to be the same. The process of censoring is, however, mainly governed by the finite 
sample property; the true model does not have a probability mass at one (Simar and 
Wilson 2007). Some additional problems are outlined by Simar and Wilson (2007). The 
efficiency scores are serially correlated in an unknown way because they depend on all 
observations in the sample. Moreover, inputs and outputs must be correlated with the 
environmental variables for a second stage analysis to make sense. But then the error  
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term of the second stage is correlated with the efficiency scores. These correlations dis 
appear asymptotically, but the convergence rate is very low so that standard inference is 
not possible. The efficiency score itself converges to the true value very slowly, too. 
Another problem is that the efficiency scores are systemativally biased downward. To 
overcome these problems, Simar and Wilson (2007) suggest using a truncated regres 
sion at the second stage and to base inference on a bootstrap procedure in which the ef 
ficiency  score  is  bias corrected  and  the  serial  correlation  is  taken  into  account.  We 
therefore apply their second double bootstrap algorithm with L1=100 replications and 
L2=2000 replications.  
In addition, we calculate the scale efficiency measure (this time without controlling for 
















i i Y C
Y C
Y C  
where i is the Index of the i th municipality and d() is the input distance function under 
constant (CRS) or variable returns (VRS) to scale. For municipalities producing at op 
timum scale SE equals 1.  
4.3   Data 
The data set comprises all municipalities in Saxony Anhalt except the three district free 
towns at the end of 2004. Municipal budget data for 2004 are taken from the statistics of 
local government accounts. Other data are obtained from the Statistical Office of Saxo 
ny Anhalt, too, as well as from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban 
Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR).  
If municipalities belong to a municipal association, their budgets, including the budget 
of the association if existent, are aggregated. Overall, we thus analyze 46 independent 
municipalities and 157 administrative collectivities of which 122 are type A associa 
tions and 35 are type B associations. 
In the statistics of local government accounts revenues and expenditures are listed ac 
cording to category (“Gliederung”) (c.f.table 1) and type (“Gruppierung”). Our main 
input measures are based on municipal expenditures since input quantities and prices are 
not observed. 
Regarding the type, the input measures are based only on the current account. As men 
tioned before, a few sectors of municipal government are excluded here because they ei 
ther serve as redistribution of revenues or as grants and compensations to other (general 
financial  management,  category  9)10  so  that  no  corresponding  outputs  exist  for  the 
                                                 
10 However, interest payments, which are part of category 9, are taken into account.  
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muncipality. To avoid comparison problems between municipalities with different de 
grees of outsourcing, some services are excluded which are often allocated to municipal 
enterprises (waste and sewage disposal (part of category 7) as well as the provision of 
electricity, gas, water, etc. (part of category 8)).  
The first input, labor, is measured as expenditure for staff in all categories except those 
mentioned above. Labor expenditures on average account for more than half of the total 
expenditures. Capital expenditures are measured as the sum of interest payments and 
expenditures for rent and lease. This is a relatively small part of municipal expenditures. 
The third input is resources and intermediate inputs. As such it is a relatively broad in 
put category making up a substantial part of the budget. A further breakdown into sev 
eral more homogenous inputs, however, is not possible. Corresponding to the popula 
tion, expenditures for all three inputs are the highest in independent municipalities and 
smallest in type A associations. An overview of the types that are used in the input con 
struction is given in table 2 (a more detailed overview can be found in table B in the ap 
pendix). 
Table 2:  
Construction of inputs from the types of the municipal budget 
Input  Explanation 
Labor  type number 4 except 42 (pensions) 
Capital  nr. 80 (except 809) and nr. 53; subtraction of nr. 202 
Resources and  
intermediate inputs 
nr. 50 to 79 and 84 except 53 (part of capital), except 673, 679, 68, 713, 72 
Source: authors´ compilation 
In contrast to other studies (e.g. Geys et al. 2007; Geys et al. 2008 and 2010; Kalb 
2010a; Kriese 2008) we only use economically relevant types and correct the data for 
double counting. Imputed costs and internal offsets, for example, are made only for 
book keeping purposes and cannot be related to any of the municipal functions. Finan 
cial aid for debt service to other levels of  government, tax revenue sharing,  general 
grants,  general apportionments, and the allocation to reserves cannot be matched to 
measurable communal output, either. Furthermore, expenditures for covering deficits of 
the current budget of previous years are excluded since the analysis is restricted to one 
year and should not be confounded by previous years’ financial management. Further 
more, allocations to the capital budget are left out to be consistent in restricting the 
analysis to the current account.  
Besides, rent income from other municipalities is subtracted from the capital input, and 
all  three  inputs  are  proportionately  reduced  by  reimbursements  of  expenditures  and 
grants  for  current  aims  from  member  municipalities and  counties11.  By  aggregating 
municipalities’  budgets  with  the  budget  of  the  municipal  association  reve 
                                                 
11   This includes type number 162 and 172.  
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nues/expenditures are counted twice if transfers within the municipal association are in 
volved. Since the expenditure categories combine payments to the municipal association 
and payments to the county, we include these categories but subtract the corresponding 
revenue of the municipal association. The aggregation and adjustment of the inputs is 
closely  related  to  the  calculation  formula  of  the  statistical  office  of  Saxony Anhalt 
(2010).12  
The outputs are geared to the municipality’s functions and resemble those used in other 
studies (e.g. Geys and Moesen 2009, Geys et al. 2007, Kalb 2010a). Nevertheless, they 
can often be only a rough proxy.  
On average 87% of the expenditures in category 4, social security, are made for child 
care. Moreover, almost all children visit a day care center while less than 1% is in fami 
ly day care13. Therefore the number of approved places in child care centers in the mu 
nicipality is an appropriate output14. Students in elementary school are a measure for 
category 2, which comprises mainly elementary schools. There are two municipal asso 
ciations which do not have elementary schools, resulting in zero outputs.  
Recreational area is used as a proxy for local public health, sport and recreation facili 
ties, while traffic area serves as a measure of municipal street related outputs. As the 
recreational area is relatively small and measured in the same terms as the traffic area, it 
is not used as a separate output, but combined with the traffic area.  
Certain  municipal  services  that  are  either  public  consumption  goods  for  the  private 
households or public inputs for the private enterprise sector (or both) cannot be meas 
ured properly (or adequate data is not published). This problem arises for services con 
cerning public safety, but also for many other services such as economic development 
or business  related infrastructure. Thus, we assume that these unobservable public out 
puts are correlated  with the population number (public consumption goods) and the 
number of employees subject to social security contribution (public inputs). An over 
view of the outputs is given in table 3.  
At the second stage, the DEA score is regressed on environmental variables which are 
supposed to explain differences in the efficiency level as outlined in section 3. They are 
described in table 4. 
 
                                                 
12   Statistical Office Saxony Anhalt (2009) 
13   Statistical Offices of the Federation and the States (2008), calculated from tables 1 and 2.  
14   These  numbers  are  only  available  for  2006.  The  statistics  show  that  the  number  of  availa 
ble/approved places has increased somewhat over the period 2002 to 2006 and also afterwards. No 
information on the actual number of children in child care centers is available before 2006. Thus, our 
output measure might be slightly biased upward (Statistical Office Saxony Anhalt 2010).  
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Table 3: 
Outputs 
Output  Explanation 
Population  Number of inhabitants of the municipality 
Child care places   Number of approved places in the child care centers within the  
municipality 
Children in elementary school  Number of children that visit the elementary schools in the  
municipality 
Traffic and recreational area   Traffic and recreational area in hectare 
Employees subject to social 
security contribution  
Number of employees working in the municipality who are subject to 
social security contribution 
Source: authors´ compilation 
Table 4: 
Environmental variables 
Environmental variable  Explanation 
Population density  Population divided by the total area in square kilometer 
Share of senior citizens  Population aged 65 years and older as share of total population 
Relative population change  Absolute value of the relative population change between 2000 and 
2004  
Dummy  variables  for  type  of 
municipality 
Type A associations, type B associations, base group independent 
 municipalities 
Number of municipalities  Number of municipalities within the administrative collectivity,  
=1 for independent municipalities 
Debt per capita  Total debt divided by population 
Relative equalization transfers  Equalization transfers as a percentage of total adjusted current income 
Unemployment rate  Number of unemployed in the municipality divided by population 
Source: authors´ compilation 
The institutional variables are dummy variables for the type of municipality and the 
number of member municipalities forming one municipal association. Base group of the 
dummy variables are the independent municipalities. They consist of just one member 
municipality. Municipal associations comprise up to 22 municipalities although more 
than 10 members are the exception. These large associations in term of member munici 
palities are all type A associations.  
The flypaper effect is measured by equalization transfers (grants) as a percentage of to 
tal adjusted current income. On average they account for almost one third of the whole 
budget, representing an important part of the municipal income. Additionally, debt per 
capita is included as a fiscal control variable. All municipalities have debts. The average 
is about 950 € (per inhabitant) but the variation is very large, also within the different 
municipality types.  
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As demographic variables we include population density, the share of senior citizens 
which captures the ageing aspect and relative population change to account for overall 
population  decline.  Population  density  varies  enormously between  approximately  20 
and 1200 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Independent municipalities exhibit the highest population density since many of these 
are medium sized cities. However, there is also a significant difference between type A 
and type B associations, with type A having the smallest density. To account for possi 
ble nonlinear effects of population density, a square term is also included. Senior citi 
zens are inhabitants aged 65 years and older; they are included as fraction of the total 
population. On average, this share is 20% with a maximum of about 27%. Population 
change is measured by the absolute value of the relative population change between 
2000 and 2004. Only six municipalities grew within that period. All of them are located 
in the vicinity of the two biggest cities Magdeburg and Halle. On average, population 
decline amounted to 4.5%.  
We also control for the unemployment rate, measured as the number of unemployed di 
vided by total population. On average 10% of the population are unemployed. Although 
this is a relatively high number one has to keep in mind that it would be even higher if 
measured as percentage of the labor force. Descriptive statistics of all variables are pre 
sented in table 5.  
5   Results  
Using the inputs and outputs described in the data section we calculated the linear pro 
gram allowing for variable returns to scale as given in Equation 1. Table 6 shows the re 
sults of the initial DEA program ignoring the bias of the estimated frontier. We find 
36% of the observed municipalities to be efficient. The median municipality provides its 
outputs with an efficiency score of 1.07.  
Table 6: 
Technical efficiency 
Obs  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev.  Efficient Obs 
203  1.07  1  1.71  0.14  74 (36%) 
Source: authors´ calculations 
This indicates that the median municipality could reduce its inputs by about 7% without 
output reduction if it produced efficiently. The histogram of the technical efficiency 
scores is given in figure 2.  
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Figure 2:  
Histogram of the technical efficiency scores 
 
Source: authors´ illustration 
Furthermore, we evaluate the scale efficiency for each observation by calculating the ra 
tio of its efficiency score calculated in the constant returns to scale model by its effi 
ciency score under the variable returns to scale assumption. We find that about 20% of 
all observations operate at the optimal scale. The results of the scale efficiency measure 
defined above are given in Table 7. 
Table 7: 
Scale efficiency 
Obs  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev.  Efficient Obs 
203  1.02  1  1.68  0.11  40 (20%) 
Source: authors´ calculations 
To reveal the nature of the scale inefficiencies depicted in Table 7, we follow Färe, 
Grosskopf and Logan (1983, 1985) and evaluate whether or not the municipality ob 
served operates in the non increasing returns to scale area. We find that about 43% of 
all observations operate under decreasing returns to scale and about 37% operate under 
increasing returns to scale. The forgone interpretation of the results ignores the some 
times small scale of the scale inefficiency depicted in Table 7 and the fact that coinci 
dence may be the cause in some cases. Figure 3 shows the relationship between scale 
inefficiency and population size graphically. At about 8,000 inhabitants the scale ineffi 
ciency is zero. The mean size of all scale efficient municipal associations is about 7,892 
inhabitants. At the left as well as the right hand side of this population size scale ineffi 
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Figure 3: 
Scale inefficiency and municipality size 
 
Source: authors´ illustration 
As described in the methodology section we perform the bootstrap procedure suggested 
by Simar and Wilson (2007) in order to correct the bias of the initial frontier calculation. 
The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: 
 Bias corrected technical efficiency 
Obs  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev.  Efficient Obs 
203  1.18  1.05  1.85  0.15  0 
Source: authors´ calculations 
By definition the bias corrected convex hull constructed by the DEA program is further 
away from the observed data than the initial DEA frontier. That is why we will observe 
no efficient observation if we account for the bias. The histogram of those efficiency 
scores is given in figure 4. Our calculation shows that the mean square error is lower for 
the bias corrected frontier estimation (Simar and Wilson 2000). Hence, the Simar and 
Wilson procedure is justified. Finally, we use the bias corrected efficiency scores to 
evaluate the impact of environmental variables on municipal efficiency. 
The parameter estimates and their 90% confidence intervall of the second stage boot 
strap algorithm described in Simar and Wilson (2007) are given in Table 9. First of all, 
we find a significant negative dummy for type B associations. Since the base category 
designates independent municipalities this result supports hypothesis 1. The insignifi 
cance of the dummy indicating type A associations may be caused by compensating in 
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tions described in section 3. Hence, less decentralized municipal associations are at least 
as efficient as more politically centralized ones. 
Figure 4: 
Bias corrected efficiency scores 
Source: authors´ illustration 
Furthermore, we find empirical support for hypothesis 2. Hence, ceteris paribus the ris 
ing number of municipalities in municipal associations decreases their efficiency. The 
same is true regarding hypothesis 4 where a negative impact of the debt burden on effi 
ciency is stated. 
Concerning hypothesis 3 the parameter estimated is not in line with our theoretical con 
siderations. We find a weak, but significant positive impact of equalization transfers on 
municipal efficiency. Hence, there is no empirical support for the flypaper effect or po 
tential negative efficiency effects of soft budget constraints. This might be caused by 
weak incentives to use additional municipal income efficiently due to strong equalizing 
transfers on the municipal level.  
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Finally, the parameter estimates of the other control variables given in Table 9 are in 
line with findings in the previous literature and induce further research on those issues 
not addressed in our paper. 
Table 9: 
Parameter estimates of the second stage regression 
Source: authors´ calculations 
The demographic change did not cause significant efficiency effects: Even in munici 
palities with high population decrease excess capital stocks and staff in childcare cen 
ters or primary schools were reduced. Furthermore, the slightly efficiency enhancing  
effect of the population density indicates some “economies of density” or “econonomies 
of sharing” in the provision of municipal services. Thus, due to the significantly lower 
population density a type A association transformed into an independent municipality 
might never be as efficient as an independent municipality with equal population num 
ber, but higher population density. 
The negative efficiency effect of a higher share of senior citizens might be explained by 
the fact that older people do not benefit from the main municipal expenditure categories 
(child care, primary schools) and hence, are not interested in enforcing the efficient pro 
duction of these services. But this is only an educated guess and needs further research 
work. 
6  Conclusion  
Not only in the eastern part of Germany, but also in many other countries we can wit 
ness processes of municipal amalgamations which are supposed to lead to cost savings 
and higher efficiency. In this paper, we analyze whether size effects have an impact on 
global municipal efficiency. Size effects consist of scale effects in municipal production 
  5%  Parameter  95% 
Constant  0.4953  0.7615  1.0295 
Dummy type A association   0.1271   0.0545  0.0233 
Dummy type B association   0.2542   0.1668  *   0.0831 
Population density   0.0011   0.0007  *   0.0003 
Population density squared  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000 
Number of municipalities  0.0002  0.0077  *  0.0152 
Share of senior citizens  1.7855  3.1402  *  4.4709 
Debt per capita  0.0000  0.0001  *  0.0001 
Unemployment rate   1.5280   0.2955    0.9456 
Absolute value population change   0.6271  0.5989    1.9204 
Equalization transfers    0.0082   0.0057  *   0.0032 
Number of Observations: 203  
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as well as effects of decentralized or centralized municipal organizational structures on 
technical efficiency. We applied DEA to municipal data from Saxony Anhalt in a cross 
section analysis.  The median efficiency score is 1.07 indicating that there might be 
some potential for efficiency improvement. After correcting for the bias using the Simar 
and Wilson (2007) approach, the median rises to 1.18, suggesting somewhat larger inef 
ficiencies – though still not necessarily huge efficiency deficits. Furthermore, the medi 
an value of 1.02 for scale efficiency indicates that at least 50% of the municipalities 
have already reached an approximately optimum size. Hence, the potential increases in 
municipal efficiency by further amalgamations seem to be limited. 
In a second step we analyzed which exogenous factors influence the efficiency scores. 
Deviating from similar articles this is – at least to our knowledge – the first study which 
explicitly takes into account the effects of different organizational forms – especially of 
municipal associations. The results show that one type of municipal associations (type 
B) is more efficient than independent municipalities whereas we could not find any sig 
nificant differences in technical efficiency between type A associations and independent 
municipalities. Thus, the structure and organization of municipalities are relevant as 
pects and should not be neglected in empirical analyses. Furthermore, we found signifi 
cant effects of some commonly used fiscal indicators. We showed that higher debt re 
sults in an increase in inefficiency and in line with Geys and Moesen (2009) that higher 
equalization transfers have a positive effect on efficiency. Hence, the municipalities are 
affected by some kind of fiscal illusion, but not by the flypaper effect or “soft budget 
constraints”.  
While these results suggest that forming type B municipal associations will reduce in 
efficiencies, further research is necessary to determine the specific factors which make 
these associations more efficient. As these type B associations usually have less mem 
bers than the type A associations this efficiency advantage might indicate a sort of u 
shape relationship between the number of member municipalities and overall municipal 
efficiency. Probably there is a tradeoff between effectiveness of control and coordina 
tion costs with increasing number of member municipalities. Also it should be kept in 
mind that the output indicators are (partly) very rough measures. Nevertheless, these 
findings suggest that the trend towards forming relatively large and centralized munici 
palities is not justified from an efficiency perspective, especially when many small, dis 
persed municipalities are merged. This should be taken into account in future municipal 
territorial reforms. 
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Appendix 
Table A: 
Structure of current expenditures and municipal enterprises of district affiliated munici 
palities in Saxony Anhalt 2004 
Category 














tions in this 
category 
Provision of output 
to the citizens or 
provision of interme 
diate products (over 
head cost) to other 
administration units? 
46* 
Facilities of youth welfare: 
mostly kindergartens, nurse 
ry schools and day nurseries  
23.8%  25.770%  5  output 
02 
Internal organization  
(including personnel admin 
istration, public relations 
and legal office) 
9.5%  9.720%  0  overhead cost 
03  Financial administration  4.7%  5.312%  0  overhead cost 
77  Auxiliary service units  
(vehicle fleet, building yard)  4.7%  5.163%  4  overhead cost 
211  Primary schools  4.0%  4.551%  0  output 
60  Administration of civil  
engineering  3.9%  4.038%  0  overhead cost 
11  Public order  3.5%  3.462%  0  output 
00  Municipal council, mayor  2.9%  3.396%  0  overhead cost 
63+670 
+675 
Municipal street mainte 
nance, street lighting and  
 cleaning 
4.8%  3.049%  1  output 
88  Administration of real estate 
not allocated to other tasks  1.0%  2.639%  0  overhead cost 
13  Fire protection  2.2%  2.053%  0  output 
70  Sewage disposal  4.5%  2.016%  65  output 
56  Sport facilities  1.3%  1.081%  0  output 
69 
Flood protection, water  
engineering (not including 
provision of drinking water 
or sewage disposal) 
0.9%  1.068%  0  output 
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Category 









Number of mu 
nicipal  enter 
prises/ 
special  purpose 
associations  in 
this category 
Provision  of  output 
to  the  citizens  or 
provision of interme 
diate products (over 
head  cost)  to  other 
administration units? 
58  Parks and gardens  2.1%  0.906%  5  output 
05  Special units of the central 
administration   0.8%  0.703%  0  overhead cost 
06  Jointly used facilities of the 
central administration  6.4%  0.591%  0  overhead cost 
75  Cemeteries  1.1%  0.569%  0  output 
76  Other public facilities  0.9%  0.429%  0  output 
37  Church affairs  0.5%  0.274%  0  partly output 
61  Urban planning, surveying 
and building regulation  1.1%  0.248%  0  both 
355  Adult education  0.8%  0.248%  0  output 
57  Public swimming baths  1.5%  0.245%  5  output 
43*  Other social facilities   0.3%  0.023%  5  output 
73  Markets  0.2%  0.006%  1  output 
59  Other recreational facilities  0.5%  0.004%  3  output 
    N=203  N = 203  N = 98   
Notes: 
a Ratio of current expenditures of the particular category to total current expenditures (except current expendi 
tures for financial management).  
Source: authors’ calculations 
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Table B: 
Type numbers used in input construction 
Input factor  Type  num 
bers 
Explanation  






Expenditures for voluntary work 
Wages and salaries 
Contributions to pension funds 
Social security contributions 
Financial support 
Incidental staff expenditures 






Interest payments received from other municipalities 
Rents and leases 














Maintenance of property and buildings 
Maintenance of other immoveable property 
Equipment, basic commodities 
Management of property and buildings 
Expenditures for motor vehicles 
Special expenditures for civil servants 
Further administrative and operating expenditures, expenditures 
for transport of students 
Taxes, insurances, claims 
Business expenditures 
Further general business expenditures 
Further financial expenditures 













Reimbursement of expenditures of the current account to others 
Internal offsets 
Reimbursement of expenditures of the current account by other 
municipalities 
Grants for current aims to others 
Grants for current aims by other municipalities 
Payments of social welfare to people not in institutions 
Payments of social welfare to people in institutions 
Payments to war victims and similar eligible people 
Payments of youth welfare outside institutions 
Payments of youth welfare in institutions 
Other social payments 
Payments  according  to  the  law  about  payments  for  asylum 
seekers 
Source: authors’ illustration  
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Table C: 
Excluded type numbers 
Type number  Explanation 
42  Pension benefits 
68  Imputed costs 
72  Help for debt service 
81  Tax sharing (expenditures) 
82  General grants (expenditures) 
83  General apportionments (expenditures) 
85  Reserve 
86  Allocations to the capital budget  
892  Deficits of the current budget of previous years 
Source: authors’ illustration 
 
 